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Key Points
•

A review of 82 modern New York cases reveals an
unexpected
frequency
of
authority
requiring
contractual definiteness as to what may reasonably
appear to be minor terms.

•

Illustrative are cases holding inadequately definite
ordinary ways preliminary agreements may express
compensation on a percentage of net basis. Other
unexpected authority (i) is less willing than expected
to allow subsequent actions to provide sufficient
definiteness to initially indefinite agreements and (ii)
denies the enforceability of confidentiality provisions
and a right of first refusal.

•

The survey includes some unexpected support for
contracts specifying a plausibly material portion of the
consideration with inadequate definiteness as also
precluding recovery in restitution. That includes not
giving effect to thoughtful drafting choices apparently
designed to avoid that outcome.

•

The survey gives rise to unease whether a court will
find fatally indefinite an LLC operating agreement
that grants one partner unfettered discretion in choice
of section 704(c) method, if built-in-gain property is to
be contributed. There is not authority directly
addressing this issue. But the pattern of requiring
excess specificity, coupled with authority addressing
discretionary choices addressing circumstances that
are not comparable, creates concern for this author.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As part of a wider research project, eighty-two recent
opinions addressing the required definiteness for an
obligation to be enforceable in contract, in state and
Federal courts in New York, were reviewed. This article
examines some implications of the cases reviewed in that
survey having particular application to the formation of
investment vehicles under New York law.
A number of factors can contribute to participants
opting to draft arrangements that may be at material risk
for being unenforceable. For example, multiple members
of the management team to be formed may be promised
equity interests. But the details of the equity interests
may depend on the details of the complete capital
structure of the venture. And that capital structure may
be subject to revision and full documentation until all the
initial investors are signed-up.
This combination of circumstances gives rise to a
pattern, not unique to investment vehicles, where key
employees are brought onboard with vague promises of
equity interests that may be unenforceable. This
circumstance creates opportunities for opportunism if
initial promises, having only the level of detail that can be
practicably be included at the time key employees are
brought onboard, are considered unenforceable. A review
of the litigated cases reveals this type of opportunism.
This article summarizes a few recent cases that bear on
the current approach taken in state and Federal courts in
New York, illuminating how the principles these cases
adopt may limit the enforceability of the arrangements.
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING DEFINITENESS
A. Foundations of the Definiteness Requirement
The principles requiring a particular level of
definiteness for a promise to be enforceable in contract
promote two distinct concerns. One focuses on the
practicability of judicial enforcement. According to the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, promises are not
sufficiently definite to be enforceable in contract unless
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“they provide a basis for determining the existence of a
breach and for giving an appropriate remedy.”1
There is less allure to this standard than may appear
initially. New York courts allow restitution, to the extent
of performance actually rendered, where the consideration
to be paid was not stated with adequate specificity to be
enforceable in contract. The compensation in such a case
is the reasonable value of what was provided. 2 So,
existing law contemplates courts determining the
reasonable value of services in fact provided, to the extent
performance has actually been rendered, even where
rendered under promises of compensation that are
determined insufficiently definite to be enforceable in
contract.3
A second underlying concern involves notions of assent.
To say that formation of a contract is voluntary indicates
that a contractual duty should not be foisted on one
involuntarily. A lack of definiteness may be an indicator
that bargaining between the parties had not ripened into
a circumstance where each may be fairly determined to
have assented to assuming a contractual duty. These two
concerns are identified in New York authority.4
In some cases, the standard the second concern urges
will be less restrictive. Commencement of performance
may manifest an intention to be obligated where the
language alone does not.5
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (1981).
See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
3 But see infra note 36 and accompanying text (providing authority
distinguishing between appraisal proceedings and assessments of
definiteness in contract).
4 E.g., Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. v. Henry & Warren Corp.,
548 N.E.2d 203, 206 (1989). GLEN BANKS, NEW YORK PRACTICE
SERIES—NEW YORK CONTRACT LAW § 2:30, n.18 (2d ed. Westlaw
through July 2021), collects assorted cases finding promises too
vague.
5
But see generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 661, 664, 701–02 (2007) (stating as to what is generally
described as a Tribune Type II agreement, see Shann v. Dunk, 84
F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1996), “[C]ourts generally find preliminary
agreements when the parties have agreed on the nature of their
project, on the nature of the investment actions that each is
1
2
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Nevertheless, even if it is clear the parties intended to
form an enforceable agreement, arrangements may not be
sufficiently definite to be enforceable. One oft-repeating
circumstance involves a commercial lease granting the
tenant a right to extend the lease term on open
(unspecified) economic terms. In a 1981 case, styled
Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, New
York’s highest court held unenforceable such a provision
where the economic terms were to be “at annual rentals to
be agreed upon.”6 Although that case manifestly involved
a severable unenforceable arrangement, similar principles
apply to promises that are not parts of pairs of
performances that properly can be severed, leaving some
enforceable obligations.7
One may encounter in other jurisdictions authority in
tension with Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen. For
example, some authority in Missouri takes the rather
startling approach that an agreement governed by the
common law, involving construction work to mitigate
flood damage, that lacked a price term was enforceable.8
Although recovery of reasonable compensation in
restitution would be conventional, and thus the outcome
is unsurprising, the conclusion an enforceable contract
existed is unexpected. The court founds its outcome on the
fact that “establishing a price in advance was impossible
in the context of the complex flood mitigation project,”9 a
principle that militates against the approach taken in
Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen.

committed to undertake, and on the order in which these actions are
to be pursued. This baseline for finding an actionable commitment is
independent of many of the factors that have been made doctrinally
salient, such as the number of open terms and the extent of part
performance.” (footnote omitted)).
6 417 N.E.2d 541, 542, 544 (N.Y. 1981).
7 E.g., Cooper Square Realty, Inc. v. A.R.S. Mgmt., Ltd., 581
N.Y.S.2d 50, 50 (App. Div. 1992) (addressing brokerage a agreement
providing “a commission to be separately determined”).
8 Michaud Mitigation, Inc. v. Beckett, 630 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2021), transfer denied, 2021 Mo. LEXIS 402 (Oct. 26, 2021)
(relying on Allied Disposal, Inc. v. Bob’s Home Serv., Inc., 595 S.W.2d
417 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
9 Id. at 800.
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New York authority of over a century ago, Varney v.
Ditmars, indicates that, in the context of sale of goods, a
phrase similar to “fair share,” “fair and reasonable value,”
may be taken as “synonymous with ‘market value.’”10
That authority distinguishes the case where an employee
is promised additional compensation consisting of “a fair
share of my profits.” The court states:
The contract in question, so far as it relates to a
share of the defendant’s profits, is not only
uncertain, but it is necessarily affected by so many
other facts that are in themselves indefinite and
uncertain that the intention of the parties is pure
conjecture. A fair share of the defendant’s profits
may be any amount from a nominal sum to a
material part according to the particular views of the
person whose guess is considered. . . . The courts
cannot aid parties in such a case when they are
unable or unwilling to agree upon the terms of their
own proposed contract.11
Additionally, New York law provides that a subsequent
agreement among the parties can render sufficiently
definite an agreement that originally was inadequately
definite to be enforceable.12
However, one occasionally encounters authority that
validates agreements that would appear not to be
adequately definite under the typical approach. Bravia
Capital Partners, Inc. v. Fike is one such relatively
modern apparent outlier. It involves an independent
contractor providing services under a contract stating she
“will be entitled to a bonus depending on [her] overall
contribution to the Company.”13 The court denies a motion
to dismiss a claim apparently seeking recovery in
Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822, 824 (N.Y. 1916).
Id. But see Lawrence v. Saratoga Lake Ry., 43 Hun’s 467, 469–
70, 472–73, 477 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1885) (HeinOnline, State Reports: A
Historical Archive) (reversing dismissal of a complaint seeking
specific performance of a railroad’s promises to “erect . . . a neat and
tasteful station building”).
12 See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
13 Bravia Cap. Partners, Inc. v. Fike, No. 09 Civ. 6375 (JFK), 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141013, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2011) (alteration in
original).
10
11
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contract,14 stating, “Courts have identified several
possible metrics for determining bonus amount, including
bonus history, the employee’s profitability for the firm,
and the firm’s overall profits.”15
B. Adequate Specification of “Material” Terms
A traditional statement is that an enforceable contract
requires adequate specification of all “material” terms.16
Subject to some equivocation,17 New York authority
appears to follow this principle. “Few principles are better
settled in the law of contracts than the requirement of
definiteness. If an agreement is not reasonably certain in
its material terms, there can be no legally enforceable
contract.”18
Some authority that addresses the standards for
materiality uses vague language and avoids articulation
of a useful standard.19 One example is the following: “In

14 The relevant claim, although not expressly styled breach of
contract, states the recipient of the services “is obligated by the
Agreement to pay [her] a non-discretionary bonus for her services . . .
.” Amended Answer at 31, ¶ 227, Bravia Capital Partners, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 141013 (No. 09 Civ. 6375 (JFK)). It further alleges, “This
non-discretionary bonus can be objectively determined by the finder
of facts, based on the ‘contributions’ made by [her].” Id. at 31 ¶ 228.
15 Bravia Capital Partners, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141013 at *14.
16 Express Indus. & Terminal Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Transp.,
715 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1999) (requiring “the parties are truly in
agreement with respect to all material terms”); Spectrum Rsch. Corp.
v. Interscience Inc., 661 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (App. Div. 1997).
17 Express Indus., 715 N.E.2d at 1053 (“While there are some
instances where a party may agree to be bound to a contract even
where a material term is left open (see, e.g., UCC 2-305[1] . . .), there
must be sufficient evidence that both parties intended that
arrangement.”). But see generally Armstrong v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
349 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73, 75 (D. Mass. 2004) (treating as
unenforceable—not as an enforceable common law analogue of output
contracts under U.C.C. § 2-306(1) 1A U.L.A. 213 (2012)—a promise to
employees (ceramic grinders) starting their own firm that the former
employer would direct to the new venture “all the [outsourced
grinding] work they could handle”).
18 Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. v. Henry & Warren Corp., 548
N.E.2d 203, 206 (N.Y. 1989).
19 A recent article articulates the following standard: “[T]he
missing or uncertain term is essential and goes to a party’s core
performance duties under the contract.” Brian A. Blum, The Protean
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determining whether the parties intended to enter a
contract, and the nature of the contract’s material terms,
we look to the ‘objective manifestations of the intent of the
parties as gathered by their expressed words and
deeds.’”20
Some clarification can be realized by referencing
application of one of the standards in individual cases. In
one such case, New York’s highest court suggests that a
material term need not be economically large, if it is
“crucial to the financial viability” of the economic activity
in question.21 One has to state the court “suggests” that,
as opposed to holding that, because the opinion’s language
reflects a casual style of detailing the analysis. The court
holds the relevant terms are material.22 However, the
court does not directly state the inadequately-addressed
term is material simply because its resolution would be
“crucial to the financial viability” of the undertaking for
one party. Rather, the opinion is structured first to
provide the conclusion and then to follow it with a
recitation of facts supporting that conclusion.
A case from an intermediate appellate court states:
Essential terms that must be set forth in the
written contract are “those terms customarily
encountered in a particular transaction.” The issue
is not whether the court could determine the omitted
terms from an agreement, but, rather, whether the

Concept of Materiality in Contract Law, 2020 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643,
673 (2020).
20 Stonehill Cap. Mgmt. LLC v. Bank of the W., 68 N.E.3d 683, 689
(N.Y. 2016) (quoting Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. Beam
Constr. Corp., 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (N.Y. 1977)). See also Spectrum
Rsch., 661 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (“Significantly, the contracts fail to
delineate the precise nature of the work to be subcontracted, price
and manner of payment and time of performance. While these
omissions might not be material under some circumstances, given the
complexity of the work . . . and the fact that the parties were unable
to reach an agreement on these issues after extended negotiations, we
conclude that the subject contract fails for indefiniteness.”).
21 Express Indus., 715 N.E.2d at 1053.
22 Id.
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parties had a meeting of the minds in the first
place.23
The first standard, and application of the second standard
in some contexts, may suggest more must be specified
than one might expect. This second standard would
appear to invalidate many so-called Tribune Type I
agreements.24
Total Telcom Group Corp. v Kendal on Hudson,25 a
2018 case, also suggests more certainty may be required
than one may expect. The case affirms summary
judgment dismissing a claim for breach of contract, 26 on
indefiniteness grounds. The plaintiff alleged that, under
the contract, it “sold, installed and maintained wiring
equipment” for television and internet services to the
premises.27 The contract provided the plaintiff had “the
exclusive license to be the only satellite and internet
provider on the property,” described by the plaintiff as
follows: “Plaintiff would receive ‘residuals’—in essence a
commission—from the provider of satellite television
service for each resident that received satellite television
service. Additionally, with respect to internet service,
plaintiff would resell to the residents of defendant’s
facility ‘bandwidth’ that plaintiff in turn purchased from
an internet service provider.”28
The court held the contract “lacked a material term
regarding the price or fees to be paid to the plaintiff for
Internet-related service, and therefore constituted an
unenforceable agreement to agree.”29 In briefing, the
plaintiff asserted that although the complaint did not
23 McGowan v. Clarion Partners, LLC, No. 650710/2015, 2019 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 3558, at *14–15 (Sup. Ct. July 1, 2019) (quoting Argent
Acquisitions, LLC v. First Church of Religious Sci., 990 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4
(App. Div. 2014)), aff’d, 132 N.Y.S.3d 281 (App. Div. 2020), appeal
denied, 37 N.Y.3d 903 (N.Y. 2021).
24 See infra note 89 and accompanying text (defining this type of
agreement).
25 68 N.Y.S.3d 491 (App. Div. 2018).
26 Id. at 492.
27 Complaint at 2, Total Telcom, 68 N.Y.S.3d 491 (No. 2016-04991).
28 Affirmation in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
and Other Relief at 5, Total Telcom, 68 N.Y.S.3d 491 (No. 201604991).
29 Total Telcom, 68 N.Y.S.3d at 493.
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allege compensation to be paid by the defendant, that
deficiency was not dispositive, because the plaintiff was to
receive its compensation from the customers.30
To this author, the plaintiff’s argument seems
persuasive. But that approach is rejected by the court. So,
the decision provides further support for the notion that
the scope of those terms that are “material,” and on which
agreement must be reached, is rather broad.
C. Vesting in One Party Specification of a
Material Term
(1) General Principles
A third element of our introductory sketch of general
principles imposing definiteness requirements involves
agreements that vest in one party discretion to set a
material term. Although the issue can be significant, it is
not prominent in the recent New York authority identified
below.
A contractual grant of discretion in one party to set one
or more terms may give rise to questions of
unenforceability. A standard solution is to restrict the
exercise of discretion by a good faith requirement.31
However, a contract may purport to eliminate such a
limit, by referencing the term being set in a party’s sole
and absolute discretion. Such a limit often which will be
given effect.32
In some contexts, a court may summarily conclude a
good faith limit is not applicable, even absent language
30 Total Telcom, Affirmation in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment and Other Relief at 6–7, 68 N.Y.S.3d 491 (No. 2016-04991).
31 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33, cmt. e (1981);
cf., e.g., Mickle v. Christie’s, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 237, 249 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (addressing an auctioneer’s right to rescind a transaction in its
“sole discretion” as subject to good faith).
32 LJL 33rd St. Assocs. v. Pitcairn Properties Inc., 725 F.3d 184,
195–96 (2d Cir. 2013) (“However, the implied covenant of good faith
cannot create duties that negate explicit rights under a contract.”);
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Pitcairn Properties, Inc., at 22 n.11, LJL
33rd St. Assocs., LLC, 725 F.3d 184 (No. 12-1382) (referencing a New
York LLC); see also Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153–54
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (distinguishing between sole and absolute
discretion).
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having the clarity necessary to eliminate good faith in
other contexts. The following case suggests that is
particularly likely to be the approach in employment
contracts.
A 1997 intermediate appellate court opinion from New
York, Rosenbaum v. Premier Sydell, Ltd., involves an
alleged promise to provide an employee a minority
interest in the employer. The agreement is described by
the court as follows: “[T]hey orally agreed that he would
receive a minority interest therein, with the precise
amount of the interest to be determined by the individual
defendants in their discretion.”33 It appears the employee
was terminated many years thereafter.34
The opinion does not use the words “sole” or “absolute”
to describe how the parties vested discretion in the payor,
nor does it reference “good faith”—those words do not
appear in the opinion.
Many years of performance thereafter would indicate
there was assent, insofar as such an agreement might
manifest assent to an enforceable obligation. And note
that the alleged agreement is summarized as referencing
that “the precise amount” was to be determined, which
seems qualitatively different from stating the amount, if
any, would be so determined.
An objection to enforceability of that contract may be
that it is that is impracticable for a court to enforce it.35
Yet courts in other contexts value minority share
interests—in appraisal proceedings, for example. It is
practicable, then, for a court to receive evidence about this
style of valuation and reach an outcome.36

33 Rosenbaum v. Premier Sydell, Ltd., 659 N.Y.S.2d 52, 52 (App.
Div. 1997).
34 Id. at 52–53.
35 But see supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
36 See generally Amaysing Techs. Corp. v. Cyberair Communs.,
Inc., Civ. A. No. 19890, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 72, at *16–17 (Ch. May
28, 2004) (distinguishing between judicial decision-making in
appraisal actions and proof of damages in breach of contract),
dismissed, Civ. A. No. 19890-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 35 (Ch. Mar.
3, 2005).
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A California court treated the issue of whether one
party’s discretion in setting the terms of the consideration
renders the agreement unenforceable as founded on
principles of unconscionability. It states, “But unless the
consideration given was so one-sided as to create an issue
of unconscionability, the courts are not in a position to
decide whether legal consideration agreed to by the
parties is or is not fair.”37 Framing the issue in that way
is unlikely to result in a conclusion of unenforceability.38
(2) Issues Specific to Entities to Be Treated as
Partnerships for U.S. Tax Purposes
These principles give this author some unease as to the
enforceability of what are apparently common terms in
organic documents for limited liability companies to be
treated as partnerships for U.S. tax law. Ordinary
principles of contract law may invalidate limited liability
company operating agreements. That was the case as to
the Statute of Frauds, which invalidated some limited
liability company agreements before a statutory change in
Delaware.39 Authority from the Southern District of New
York invalidated an operating agreement for a Delaware
limited liability company where the entity was formed for
an illegal purpose.40
In some contexts, the nature of the entity formed, and
the business entity law applicable to that form of
business, will be treated as negating application of
ordinary contract principles to organic agreements.41
37 Third Story Music, Inc. v. Waits, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747, 753 n.5
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
38 The most apt New York authority found is not particularly
helpful. Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741, 762–63
(S.D.N.Y.), on reargument, 742 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
39 Olson v. Halvorsen, 986 A.2d 1150, 1162 (Del. 2009) (“[T]he
statute of frauds applies to LLC agreements.”), superseded by statute,
2010 Delaware Laws Ch. 287 (H.B. 372).
40 Carruthers v. Flaum, 365 F. Supp. 2d 448, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(addressing an illegal purpose consisting of engaging in illegal
gaming operations on the lands of an unrecognized tribe), further
proceedings at 388 F. Supp. 2d 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), summary
judgment granted, 450 F. Supp. 2d 288, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
41 Compare Est. of Kingston v. Kingston Farms P’ship, 13 N.Y.S.3d
748, 750–51 (App. Div. 2015) (ordinary principles of contract, under
which a written contract may be amended by conduct, apply to
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However, Spires v. Casterline holds “no provision in the
Limited Liability Company Law impos[es] any type of
penalty or punishment for failing to adopt a written
operating agreement.”42 So, there does not appear to be
room for application of such a saving principle to make
enforceable a New York limited liability company
operating agreement that is unenforceable under ordinary
contract principles.
The relevant nature of these provisions may be
sketched briefly. An owner’s recognition of income for tax
purposes on a partnership interest does not depend the
owner’s receipt of income.43 So, the owner’s actual return
may be negative for many years, where the owner has to
pay taxes on income the owner does not actually receive.
And the concerns may be exacerbated where partners
have contributed non-cash property. U.S. partnership tax
law affords the entity multiple ways to address anomalies
arising from property contributed to an entity, treated as
a partnership for U.S. tax purposes, with a market value
in excess of the contributor’s basis.44 That can include
arrangements where one partner realizes income or gain
in respect of a piece of property but another recognizes

amendments to general partnership agreements) with A & F
Hamilton Heights Cluster, Inc. v. Urban Green Mgmt., Inc., 129
N.Y.S.3d 413, 418–19 (App. Div. 2020) (rejecting the argument that
this authority extends to amendments to limited partnership
agreements, noting the separate “detailed statutory scheme”
applicable to limited partnerships), appeal denied, 168 N.E.3d 1150
(N.Y. 2021).
42 Spires v. Casterline, 778 N.Y.S.2d 259, 262 (Sup. Ct. 2004). Cf.
In re Fassa Corp., 924 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding the
exercise of a contractual right to terminate an operating agreement
triggers the dissolution of the LLC, where the operating agreement is
otherwise silent as to what triggers a dissolution).
43 See, e.g., EDWARD F. KOREN, ESTATE, TAX AND PERSONAL
FINANCIAL PLANNING § 38:12 n.72 (Westlaw through Dec. 2021)
(discussing “phantom income”).
44 See, e.g., LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE
LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K: A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO THE TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS, ch. 7 (6th ed. 2020) (discussing the traditional
method, the traditional method with curative allocations and the
remedial allocation method).
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expense or loss.45 And different approaches can be used
for different pieces of contributed property, as long as the
overall method is reasonable,46 providing overwhelming
flexibility.
We have above sketched some ordinary standards for
assessing whether the scope of permitted discretion in one
party to set terms, in a putative entire contract, is too
broad to give rise to an enforceable contract. Those
standards seem to contemplate the extent to which the
disadvantaged party may have some minimum return.
Application of those approaches is difficult where the
range of possible outcomes is very broad and includes
some that may be substantially negative.
Yet a form agreement in a leading treatise provides for
one party having sole discretion in selecting the method
or methods for addressing property contributed with a
built-in gain.47 One supposes that the scope of possible
concern may not be as prominent because an
understanding of the issue depends on knowledge of
principles of both the law of contracts and partnership tax
law, the latter being a notoriously opaque area of tax law.
Moreover, there is some relatively old authority, which
may not have survived Teachers Insurance & Annuity
Ass’n of America v. Tribune Co.,48 that appears to require
more specification than seems necessary. In Allen & Co. v.
Occidental Petroleum Corp., the court holds fatally
indefinite49 an alleged joint venture stating in relevant
part: “[W]e agree to the same arrangements with you on
the possible second concessions as on the first concessions,
namely, Occidental will share on the basis of 75% for us
and 25% for you on anything Ferdinand Gallic turns up.
45 See, e.g., id. at 135 (discussing offsetting notional allocations
under the remedial allocation method).
46 26 C.F.R. § 1.704-3(a)(2) (Westlaw through Dec. 17, 2021).
47 It grants the general partner “sole and absolute discretion” as to
certain matters “including the authority to make . . . any available
tax elections.” ROBERT L. WHITMIRE ET AL., STRUCTURING & DRAFTING
PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS: INCLUDING LLC AGREEMENTS app. A.27,
§ 6.3(a) (4th ed., Westlaw through Oct. 2021).
48 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
49 Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 382 F. Supp. 1052,
1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d, 519 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1975).
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This includes sharing costs to be mutually agreed upon
and profits.”50
This arrangement seems akin to a default for
partnerships, in which ordinary costs require majority
approval, although perhaps they intended this to be based
on a majority in interest,51 with extraordinary acts
requiring unanimous approval. And partnership law
provides a wealth of background defaults that will apply,
sufficient to make even the most rudimentary agreement
of partnership enforceable. It bears mention, however, one
may nevertheless encounter other authority finding
agreements contemplating partnership insufficiently
definite notwithstanding these background defaults.52
D. Divisibility and Severing an Indefinite Term;
Restitution as an Alternative
Issues of divisibility are often presented in cases
involving one or more promises that are fatally indefinite.
A related issue arises where there is an indefinite term,
not part of a pair of equivalents, and whether that can or
should be severed.
Sometimes the issue is expressly referenced, sometimes
not. The seminal New York case of Joseph Martin, Jr.,
Delicatessen,
Inc.
v. Schumacher,
which finds
unenforceable a lease renewal provision at “rentals to be
agreed upon,”53 does not reference “severability” or
“divisibility.” That arrangement—a fatally indefinite
lease renewal—seems particularly likely to involve a
divisible agreement, which may account for the opinion’s
failure to address the issue. However, in other cases, a
court’s simply severing an indefinite promise seems inapt
Id. at 1056 (revised to include manually inserted addition).
The opinion notes: “[P]laintiff’s counsel, who . . . either
authorized or approved the phrase ‘to be mutually agreed upon’ . . .
testified that he understood the phrase to apply differently to the two
phases of the proposed joint venture—as to the acquisition of the
concessions, consent of the plaintiff to costs was required; however,
once acquired, the defendant had absolute discretion to expend
whatever sums it deemed necessary in exploiting the concessions.” Id.
at 1059 (footnote omitted).
52 See Cleland v. Thirion, 704 N.Y.S.2d 316, 319 (App. Div. 2000).
53 Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417
N.E.2d 541, 542, 544 (N.Y. 1981).
50
51
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and, in some cases, to be the consequence of failure to
grapple consciously with the issue of divisibility or
severability.
(1) General Tests for Divisibility and Severing
Where an agreement is divisible, fatal indefiniteness as
to a material promise in one of the pairs of reciprocal
promises or performances will not render unenforceable
pairs that are not indefinite.54 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, applying this principle in the context of
indefiniteness, quotes with approval the following
standard for divisibility:
A contract made at the same time for different
articles at different prices is not an entire contract,
unless the taking of the whole is essential from the
character of the property, or is made so by the
agreement of the parties, or unless it is of such a
nature that a failure to obtain part of the articles
would materially affect the object of the contract,
and thus have influenced the sale had such a failure
been anticipated.55
There is some New York law that seems to find
divisible a contract that does not seem so. One old case
involves a contract for purchase of personal property as to
which the buyer has a return right. The case holds the
return rights divisible, where the repurchase price was “a
stipulated price ‘against delivery, part cash and other
terms to be agreed upon between the parties.’”56 The
opinion includes only conclusory discussion as to why the
repurchase arrangement, found to be insufficiently
definite, was severable.57 On its face, a right of return,
even if on indefinite terms, seems to this author not
54 E.g., Wilhelm Lubrication Co. v. Brattrud, 268 N.W. 634, 636
(Minn. 1936).
55 Id. (quoting McGrath v. Cannon, 57 N.W. 150, 151 (Minn.
1893)).
56 Shur-On Standard Optical Co. v. Viopake Co., 223 N.Y.S. 157,
158–59 (App. Div. 1927).
57 Id. at 159 (“But the provision for purchasing back goods sold,
delivered, and on hand was separable from the rest of the contract,
and was indefinite, as it seems, in the same way as was the contract
in the Ansorge Case. While our defendant agreed to buy the goods
back at a stated price, the terms of payment were indefinite.”).
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inherently divisible. Rather, it seems to meet the
standards for entire agreements referenced above—that
failure of the repurchase promise “would materially affect
the object of the contract” and would have “influenced the
sale had such a failure been anticipated.”58
Severing an Indefinite Term in an Entire Contract.
Different options are available to a court where an
indefinite provision is not part of a pair of corresponding
divisible performances. The court may conclude this
results in the contract being unenforceable. In such a
case, a party who has performed should be able to recover
in restitution to the extent of any enrichment in excess of
any compensation previously paid.59
Alternatively, the court may simply sever the indefinite
provision and hold that the definite provisions constitute
enforceable contractual terms between the parties. In the
absence of a material breach, this would limit recovery by
a party as contractually specified.
Consider for example, an employee promised fixed
compensation and a fatally indefinite bonus. The court
could find the agreement as a whole unenforceable,
because a material term is not specified with adequate
definiteness. That would allow the employee who had
performed to recover in restitution.60 In this style of the
vignette, it is the employee taking the position that the

See supra text accompanying note 55.
United Press v. N.Y. Press Co., 58 N.E. 527, 527–28 (N.Y. 1900)
(discussing an express contract identifying merely a maximum price,
which had been paid for some time; stating, “where work has been
done, or articles have been furnished, a recovery may be based upon
quantum meruit or quantum valebant”); Plattenburg v. Briggs, 151
N.Y.S. 925, 925–26 (App. Div. 1915) (entitlement to the fair value of
services rendered under contract providing for care during the
obligor’s lifetime of “six dollars per week, and if she shall remain with
me during my lifetime to provide for a generous sum”); Heller v.
Kalisch, 125 N.Y.S. 1057, 1058–59 (App. Div. 1910) (involving
compensation for a lawyer successful in litigation, where a letter from
the stated, “If we win, then I will leave it to you to determine the
amount of compensation.”).
60 E.g., Buxbaum Holdings, Inc. v. Haggar Clothing Co., No. 3:12CV-2167-P, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197549, at *9, *17–18 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 7, 2014). See also infra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
58
59
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indefinite provision is material, and the employer who
would be arguing the other position.
The court could conclude that the indefinite portion is
not of sufficient significance to prevent contract
formation. In this case, the court may simply strike the
indefinite promise, and enforce the remainder.61
The positions may be reversed. The employer may
assert the indefinite term is material and, thus, a contract
was not formed. That posture would be taken where the
employer’s definite contractual obligation is more than
what the employer believes would be payable in
restitution.
For example, a Georgia case, Christensen v. Roberds of
Atlanta, Inc., holds indefinite and unenforceable an
alleged agreement in which “bonuses would be paid to
[the employee] by [the employer] in addition to [the
employee’s] salary and that the amount of these bonuses
would be $7,000 to $8,000 per year.”62 The court holds
“the oral contract . . . was legally unenforceable”63 by
virtue of lack of definiteness.
Such a contract might be treated as enforceable as to
the alleged fixed (non-bonus) salary, with the bonus
struck. The court appears not to take that position—it
quoted prior authority to the effect that “until the parties
have agreed upon a definite amount to be paid the
contract is incomplete.”64 Where the fixed amount had
already been paid, the outcome would be the same, one
would think. The employer should not be able to recover
in restitution non-bonus amounts previously paid. Their
retention would not be unjust (or one might conclude their

61 Id. at *8, *13 (discussing a bonus “to be mutually agreed upon
by the parties” and referencing leaving the “unsettled point . . .
unperformed and the remainder of the contract . . . enforced” (quoting
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct., 333 P.2d 745, 750 (Cal. 1959)).
62 375 S.E.2d 267, 270 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988).
63 Id.
64 Id. (emphasis in Christensen) (quoting Weill v. Brown, 29 S.E.2d
54, 57 (Ga. 1944)).
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payment could not be recouped under the voluntary
payment doctrine65).
One can encounter a number of different tests as to
whether an indefinite term ought to be severed with the
remainder of the contract enforceable. In terms of
taxonomy, the following statement is representative: “In
Delaware, as in most jurisdictions, a court will not enforce
a contract that is indefinite in any of its material and
essential provisions. However, a court will enforce a
contract with an indefinite provision if the provision is not
a material or essential term.”66
Authority indicates that whether the remainder ought
to be enforced depends on the parties’ intent.67 Perillo
provides the following standard for assessing whether the
remaining, definite provisions should be enforced: “The
test is whether the parties would have entered into the
agreement without the offending clauses.”68
California’s Supreme Court focuses on the fairness of
enforcement of the remainder, in the following language:
The enforceability of a contract containing a promise
to agree depends upon the relative importance and
the severability of the matter left to the future; it is
a question of degree and may be settled by
determining whether the indefinite promise is so
essential to the bargain that inability to enforce that
promise strictly according to its terms would make
unfair the enforcement of the remainder of the
agreement. Where the matters left for future
65 E.g., Dillon v. U-A Columbia Cablevision of Westchester, Inc.,
790 N.E.2d 1155, 1156 (N.Y. 2003) (“[The voluntary payment
doctrine] bars recovery of payments voluntarily made with full
knowledge of the facts, and in the absence of fraud or mistake of
material fact or law.”). See also, e.g., Wurtz v. Rawlings Co., LLC, No.
12-CV-1182 (JMA) (AKT), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172680 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 17, 2016).
66 Echols v. Pelullo, 377 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation
omitted).
67 VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 285 (3d
Cir. 2014).
68 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 60 (7th ed. 2014). See also E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.39 (4th ed.
VitalLaw through Dec. 2021).
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agreement are unessential, each party will be forced
to accept a reasonable determination of the unsettled
point or if possible the unsettled point may be left
unperformed and the remainder of the contract be
enforced.69
One court referencing this standard further opines,
“Bonuses would typically be immaterial because they are
usually optional payments, delegated to the discretion of
one party.”70
Express contractual language providing for severability
may inform the determination71 but may not be
determinative as applied to a particular context.72
In Christensen v. Roberds of Atlanta, Inc., discussed
above,73 we have a circumstance that brings to mind the
“blue pencil” rule applicable to reforming overly broad
non-competition agreements. Let us say that the parties
in Christensen had instead bargained for compensation in
the form of: “a salary of $X,” where X was a stated figure,
“plus a minimum bonus of $7,000 and an additional bonus
of up to $1,000, with the additional bonus to be set by the
employer”.
One supposes that the right answer would be to strike
the additional bonus, and that the same result would
obtain where the additional bonus was stated as
something to be agreed between the parties. The
magnitude of the additional bonus is so small that
enforcement of the remainder would not be “unfair,” the
test favored in California. And it would seem sufficiently
minor that Perillo’s test, which addresses whether the
parties would have entered the agreement without the
offending indefinite provision, is also met.

69 City of Los Angeles v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles Cty., 333 P.2d
745, 750 (Cal. 1959) (citation omitted).
70 Buxbaum Holdings, Inc. v. Haggar Clothing Co., No. 3:12-CV2167-P, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197549, at *16 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7,
2014)
71 VICI Racing, 763 F.3d at 285.
72 Eckles v. Sharman, 548 F.2d 905, 909 (10th Cir. 1977)
(referencing such a provision as an “aid to construction”).
73 See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
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However, if the parties opt to communicate an
economically identical arrangement using different words
that does not separate the minimum portion, a court may
be more inclined to strike the entire arrangement. That
does not seem sensible, particularly where, as were the
circumstances of Christensen,74 the agreement is oral.
Rather, it seems to reflect the excess formality reflected in
the now-discredited blue pencil approach to addressing
overbroad non-competition agreements.75 More generally,
one supposes an obligee/plaintiff expressly entitled to
some adequately specified performance would not lose its
contractual claim under an adequately definite obligation
merely because it was also the beneficiary of a fatally
indefinite obligation that it is willing to ignore.76
Restitution Where Material. An “unreported” 2019 case
from the Second Circuit, Brook v. Simon & Partners LLP,
addresses availability of restitution where an employment
contract contains a promised, indefinite bonus. It involves
an allegation that an employer was to provide the
employee a non-discretionary bonus, which was agreed to
be fixed “mutually.”77 The opinion states:
[The employee] may be able to plead that the total
amount of his compensation was sufficiently
material that its indeterminacy negated the
existence of a contract. . . . Thus, additional

74 Christensen v. Roberds of Atlanta, Inc., 375 S.E.2d 267, 269 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1988).
75 See generally 15 TIMOTHY MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 89.8 (LEXIS 2021) [hereinafter CORBIN ON CONTRACTS] (referencing
“the much-maligned strict blue-pencil approach”).
76 See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in
Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 422
(asserting that in lieu of finding an agreement fatally indefinite, a
court could formulate a remedy based on the least favorable to the
claimant as among the available options; referencing a prior edition
of CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 78, § 4.1, which currently
states, “Where the parties intend to contract but defer agreement on
certain essential terms until later, the gap can be cured if one of the
parties offers to accept any reasonable proposal that the other may
make.”).
77 Brook v. Simon & Partners LLP, 783 F. App’x 13, 18 (2d Cir.
2019).
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allegations may support [the employee’s] entitlement
to recover under a quasi-contract theory.78
(2) Approach More Favorable to a Remedy
There is some Federal authority, potentially no longer
valid, that may be understood as involving recovery on a
hybrid basis in respect of an indefinitely stated promise in
an entire contract. Knapp v. McFarland79 states:
The New York cases reveal that (1) where parties
enter into an agreement providing for certain
immediate compensation to be paid and also provide
for a subsequent upward adjustment of that
compensation, to be determined at a later time, the
contract is enforceable; and further (2) that if the
parties fail to definitively reach an understanding as
to what shall constitute the premium, the court will
determine an appropriate bonus rather than deem
the contract unenforceable.80
(3) Inconsistent
Contracts

Treatment

Concerning

Services

As noted above, recent unreported Federal appellate
authority in the Second Circuit indicates an employee can
recover in restitution in respect of an apparently material,
non-discretionary bonus where the amount was to be
agreed between the parties.81 However, where a promise
is indefinite because it grants unfettered discretion in one
party to set compensation, the scope of the discretion may
78 Id. at 19. One supposes the court in Rosenbaum v. Premier
Sydell, Ltd, discussed supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text,
would have rejected a claim in restitution as well. One does not know
for sure, because such a claim was not referenced in the opinion.
Rosenbaum v. Premier Sydell, Ltd., 659 N.Y.S.2d 52, 52 (App. Div.
1997) (referencing alleged claims of “breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and fraud”).
79 344 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
457 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1972). But see Canet v. Gooch Ware
Travelstead, 917 F. Supp. 969, 989 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing Knapp
and stating, “The power of the court to set missing material terms
was, however, limited by the decision of the New York Court of
Appeals in Joseph Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417
N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1981) . . . .” (citation reformatted)).
80 Knapp, 344 F. Supp. at 612.
81 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
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additionally prevent recovery in restitution. Davis v.
General Foods Corp. involves a promise by the food
manufacturer, in connection with delivery to it of a recipe,
“that the use to be made of it [the recipe] by us, and the
compensation, if any, to be paid therefor, are matters
resting solely in our discretion.”82 The court holds that
information and services provided in reply to the
statement involve “no misreliance upon a supposed
contract, and consequently no legal obligation
whatever.”83
An unexpectedly restrictive assessment of the
availability of restitution is recently provided by Foros
Advisors LLC v. Digital Globe, Inc.84 It addresses, on a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), an ancillary
undertaking in an agreement engaging an investment
bank.85 The court concludes the ancillary agreement is not
enforceable—neither as a substantive bargain nor as a
binding agreement to negotiate in good faith.86 This
provision was included in an engagement letter in which
the bank provided other strategic services, for which it
was to receive a retainer and a specified fee per quarter.
The essence of the relevant provision stated the client
“will offer [the bank] the opportunity to act as a financial
advisor to the company in connection” with “any
acquisitions or other strategic transactions as a result of
this engagement” and that the bank “agrees to consider
acting in such capacity.”87
In a transaction that was allegedly within this
provision’s scope, the client engaged two other investment
banks, paying them $36 million and $18 million.88 In
concluding the provision is not enforceable as a
substantive bargain (i.e., a Tribune Type I agreement89),
Davis v. Gen. Foods Corp., 21 F. Supp. 445, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
Id.
84 333 F. Supp. 3d 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
85 Id. at 357–58.
86 Id. at 361, 363.
87 Id. at 358 (quoting the complaint).
88 Id. at 359.
89 See Shann v. Dunk, 84 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Type I is
where all essential terms have been agreed upon in the preliminary
contract . . . .”).
82
83
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the court notes that the provision does not specify “type of
financial advisor, the scope of services, and the
compensation.”90 In light of the differing levels of
compensation ultimately paid in the transaction to two
other advisors, which the court references,91 that specific
determination seems justifiable. The circumstances as
they actually developed demonstrate a range of
qualitatively different possible activities for which the
plaintiff could have been engaged.
Further analysis provided by the court is more dubious.
The court concludes that a claim in restitution (quantum
meruit) is not available because the claim would be within
what is covered by the engagement letter.92 The court
states:
Because the Engagement Letter covers the work
that was done and for which [the bank] received
compensation, [the bank] cannot sue in quasicontract for additional compensation beyond what it
negotiated for in the Engagement Letter. [The
bank’s] quasi-contract claims for quantum meruit
and unjust enrichment must be dismissed.93
The court asserts that “the Offer Clause here does not
purport to provide compensation for the work [the bank]
actually performed under the contract.”94 The opinion
continues:
Foros[, the bank,] has not shown that it performed
any additional services that were “so distinct from”
its contractual duties that “it would be unreasonable
for [the client] to assume that they were rendered
without expectation of further pay.” Indeed, the
work Foros performed was exactly that which the
Engagement Letter explicitly required of it, and for
which the specific amount of compensation is also set
forth in the Engagement Letter. The fact that the
Offer Clause is unenforceable does not provide Foros

Foros, 333 F. Supp. 3d. at 361.
Id.
92 Id. at 366.
93 Id. at 366.
94 Id. at 365.
90
91
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the ability to renegotiate the rate for the work that it
performed pursuant to the Engagement Letter.95
The opinion does not adequately discuss divisibility,
beyond its conclusory reference to what it might not have
been unreasonable for the client to have assumed. A
Westlaw electronic search shows the word “entire” and
words with the stem of “divisib!” and “sever!” only appear
in one place, in the phrase “[d]uring the several
months”.96
The implicit standard this court appears to implement
is as follows: whether it would be unreasonable for the
person against whom the claim was made to assume
further pay was not expected.
This standard is more generous to the alleged obligor’s
position than other authority would suggest. The Federal
Third Circuit has expressly referenced both parties’
intentions in this context.97 The Minnesota Supreme
Court founded divisibility (under which an indefinite pair
of performances could be severed) on the materiality of
the potentially severed pairs of promises and whether it
would have “influenced” the bargain.98
The claimant alleged “the compensation for the work it
performed was paid at a reduced rate because of its
expectation to receive payment for future advisory
services that it did not get.”99 The procedural posture
required this allegation be accepted as true.100 This
allegation would seem sufficient to meet the standard
that a failure to obtain consideration of additional

95 Id. at 366 (citations omitted) (quoting Mid-Hudson Catskill
Rural Migrant Ministry, Inc. v. Fine Host Corp., 418 F.3d 168, 175–
76 (2d Cir. 2005)).
96 Id. at 358.
97 VICI Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 285 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“The inquiry turns on the parties’ intentions. Orenstein v.
Kahn, 119 A. 444, 445 (Del.1922) (noting that whether a contract is
severable is a question of the intent of the parties).”).
98 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
99 Foros, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 364.
100 Id. at 357.
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employment would have influenced the terms for the work
that was performed.101
This opinion represents an extreme approach to
ascertaining what promises are severable and is
inconsistent with the dictates of the “unreported” opinion
in Brook v. Simon & Partners LLP,102 discussed above.103
(4) Conclusion
New York caselaw is inconsistent as to treatment of
divisibility in the context of an agreement containing an
indefinite promise. Some old authority treats as divisible
arrangements that seem entire (not divisible).104 Yet there
is contemporary authority in the banking context that
appears to err in the opposite direction: treating as
divisible arrangements that don’t seem necessarily so.
And that modern authority does so without adequate
explanation.105
The interaction with restitution is also inconsistent.
Some Second Circuit authority will allow restitution,
based on the value of the services as a whole, where there
is an apparently non-divisible promise for a nondiscretionary bonus to be agreed.106 Yet older authority in
the Second Circuit (which may not have survived Joseph
Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher107) allows
restitution based on a non-divisible but indefinite
component of promised compensation for services. On the
other hand, recent district court authority denies
restitution where there was not performance of what, at
least to this author, appears to have been a material,
indefinite promise that should not have been severable.108

Compare supra text accompanying note 55.
783 F. App’x 13, 16 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Gray v. Lurie, 162
N.Y.S. 2d 278, 280 (App. Div. 1957)). See supra notes 77–78 and
accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
104 Shur-On Standard Optical Co. v. Viopake Co., 223 N.Y.S. 157,
159 (App. Div. 1927).
105 Foros, 333 F. Supp. 3d 354 (discussed supra notes 92–101 and
accompanying text).
106 See supra note 77–78 and accompanying text.
107 417 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1981).
108 See supra note 93.
101
102
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III. RECENT NEW YORK AUTHORITY
New York’s requirement for definiteness, as
interpreted by the courts, may unexpectedly render
unenforceable preliminary agreements that are intended
to be binding (e.g., some types of term sheets). This
section provides some illustrations.
A. Fractional Economic Interest; Computation of
Profits
(1) 20% of GP Inc
One category of recent cases involves inadequacies in
specifying an interest in a venture. Some recent
illustrations find the following insufficiently definite:
•

An agreement providing a party “20% of GP inc,”
apparently referencing the general partner’s
income;

•

An agreement that did “not include provisions
regarding . . . how profit is calculated;”109

•

An alleged agreement that failed to detail the
meaning of “carried interest,” where a separate
document did so; and

•

A term sheet specifying an equity percentage where
“[t]he structure of this economic interest is to be
determined, and likely be provided in the form of
equity or income units and performance units.”110

Each of these (in the last case, in the light of the
remedy sought being money damages, where the
complaint references amounts in reliance as well as the
value of the interest) seems adequately specified for
purposes of ascertaining whether there was a breach and
computing a remedy. Each, then, in light of the relevant
standard seems to require more specificity than one would
expect to be required.

109 Herman v. Duncan, No. 17 Civ. 3325 (PGG), 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83009, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2019).
110 McGowan v. Clarion Partners, LLC, No. 650710/2015, 2019
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3558, at *4 (Sup. Ct. July 1, 2019), aff’d, 132
N.Y.S.3d 281 (App. Div. 2020), appeal denied, 37 N.Y.3d 903 (N.Y.
2021).
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(1) 20% of GP Inc
Weisenfeld v. Iskander111 involves an alleged agreement
specifying percentage compensation—in that case,
memorialized in notes stating “20% of GP inc to me,” and
apparently referencing twenty percent of a general
partner’s income—a few months before a limited
partnership agreement was signed.112 The notes also
included other compensation, one percent of “rents
collected,”113 which was paid.114
The court concludes the reference to a percentage of
“GP inc” is inadequately definite to give rise to an
enforceable obligation, stating:
In the instant case, the Notes do not indicate a
present intent to be bound. There is nothing in the
Notes to show the parties agreed to the material
terms, including the identity of the party or parties
to be bound. Also, the Notes are too vague to
ascertain what was promised in order for the court
to enforce it. For example, the court cannot
determine from the Notes what the parties attending
the dinner actually agreed to with regard to the
critical words “GP inc.” Accordingly, the alleged
contract fails for lack of definiteness. “GP inc” is not
defined and cannot be ascertained from extraneous
sources. Even assuming “inc” refers to “income,” that
term was not defined. It has multiple meanings.”115
The opinion has a lengthy discussion of alternative
meanings of the term “income,” including reference under
partnership tax law that would list income and gain
separately.116 The court relies, inter alia, on deposition
testimony of Noel Cunningham, a co-author of an
excellent text used in law schools on partnership taxation,
to the effect that “the term income has a broad array of
meanings in accounting and financial circumstances, and
111 No. 651436/2016, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2104 (Sup. Ct. Apr.
16, 2019), aff’d, 130 N.Y.S.3d 299 (App. Div. 2020).
112 Id. at *4–5.
113 Id. at *3–4.
114 Id. at *12.
115 Id. at *16–17 (citations omitted).
116 See id. at *17–20.
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that gross income, net income, and taxable income are all
possible meanings.”117
The analysis seems ill-advised. That an agreement is
ambiguous is not by itself sufficient to conclude there was
not assent. Schwartz and Scott assert, “Contract
interpretation remains the largest single source of
contract litigation between business firms.”118 Courts
often construe ambiguous agreements—the existence of
ambiguity does not inherently result in the term being
struck.
Separately, reliance on the meaning for tax purposes in
interpreting nontax terms does not seem apt. A
partnership agreement often will be drafted with separate
provisions governing the meaning of terms for federal
income tax purposes.119 One cannot take for granted that
a general business (non-tax) lawyer will necessarily even
understand the tax-driven allocation provisions that are
ultimately in LLC operating agreements or limited
partnership agreements. The agreement itself may
expressly reference a difference in usage of terms between
amounts computed for book purposes, which represent the
pre-tax economics of the deal, and for tax purposes.120
That a term has a particular usage in an idiosyncratic
context, i.e., for tax purposes, does not mean the same
term is used with the same meaning in a general context.
The court also references the language of the separate,
subsequently-adopted limited partnership agreement.121
The partnership will ultimately determine its income, on
a book and on a tax basis. Definiteness is not properly
tested in the abstract, ex ante. Rather, the parties’
subsequent actions can clarify, and render enforceable,

Id. at *19.
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation
Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 926 (2010) (book review).
119 E.g., WHITMIRE ET AL., supra note 47, app. A.27, § 4.1(e) (a form
operating agreement beginning a provision concerning allocations of
tax attributes with the phrase, “Solely for Federal income tax
purposes”).
120 Id.
121 Weisenfeld, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2104, at *20.
117
118
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arrangements containing terms that, upon adoption, are
vague.122
As is often the case, there is a confounding
circumstance. The claimant was successor-in-interest to a
lawyer who was counsel for the individual defendants. 123
Although the language of the opinion would indicate the
promise was not sufficiently definite without reference to
that circumstance, one could certainly endeavor to
distinguish the case in litigation were one to wish to do so.
(2) Failure to Specify How Profit Calculated
Herman v. Duncan involves a signed document that the
court concludes is not enforceable. One of the relevant
factors the court identifies is that the signed document
did “not include provisions regarding . . . how profit is
calculated.”124 This part of the opinion apparently
references a buyout provision in the signed document,
which specifies a price derived from (specified multiples of
annual averages of) the venture’s “profit.”125
Indeed, assorted accounting choices may influence
determination of profits. However, at least to this author,
it seems unexpected that the failure to specify those
details should determine whether an agreement
containing a buyout based on profits is sufficiently
definite to be enforceable. That seems particularly the
case where the parties operated the venture’s business for
two years,126 which will have necessitated computation of
profit for accounting and tax purposes. Authority is clear
that an agreement is not fatally indefinite where the

122 Rubin v. Dairymen’s League Co-op. Ass’n, 29 N.E.2d 458, 460–
61 (N.Y. 1940).
123 Weisenfeld, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2104, at *20.
124 Herman v. Duncan, No. 17 Civ. 3325 (PGG), 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83009, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2019).
125 The opinion cites parts of the plaintiff’s statement of
uncontested facts, which references the “[d]efinition of ‘profit’ for the
purposes of calculating any buy-out.” Id. at *6 (citing Plaintiff’s Local
Civil Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Facts, ¶ 19, Herman, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83009 (No. 17 Civ. 3325 (PGG)).
126 Plaintiff’s Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement of Uncontested Facts
¶ 14, Herman, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83009 (No. 17 Civ. 3325 (PGG)).
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indefinite provisions are clarified by subsequent acts of
the parties.127
(3) Failure to Detail “Carried Interest,” Although
Defined in a Separate Document
Wilson v. Dantas finds unenforceable for want of
definiteness an alleged side agreement, allegedly
memorialized in part in a 2007 letter, concerning
compensation for employment by the general partner in a
limited partnership investment vehicle.128 The appellate
opinion’s discussion as to this issue is conclusory (other
issues providing alternative bases for the outcome that
are discussed in more detail). Presentation of the context
is necessary to understand the alleged agreement and the
judicial analysis.
The claim involves compensation allegedly owed an
employee of the general partner in connection with the
funding of an investment vehicle to invest in recently
privatized Brazilian businesses.129 By a series of
communications spanning a decade, the claimant sought
to have the employer confirm an equity interest as part of
his compensation. The plaintiff/employee sent a letter
dated July 1997 to the defendant memorializing the terms
of employment, which the defendant never signed.130 An
attachment to the letter referenced the plaintiff’s
compensation with the general partner included the
employee having a “CARRIED INTEREST” of “1 Point,”
noted the point “will carry no vesting requirement,” with
“[a]ny Points subsequently allocated” to be “subject to a
five year vesting period of 20% per year.”131 A footnote to
“CARRIED INTEREST” states, “1 Point out of 20 Points
(or 5%) of the General Partner’s carried interest.”132
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
103 N.Y.S.3d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2019), appeal denied, 34
N.Y.3d 909 (N.Y. 2020).
129 Wilson v. Dantas, No. 650915/12, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 133,
at *1 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2018), aff’d, 103 N.Y.S.3d 381, appeal denied,
34 N.Y.3d 909 (N.Y. 2020).
130 Id. at *9.
131 Affirmation of Paul Fattaruso in Support of Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment, exhibit 8, at 2, Dantas, 2018 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 133 (No. 650915/12), NYSCEF Doc. No. 289.
132 Id.
127
128
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The limited partnership agreement dated December
1997 provided the general partner would in fact have a
20% interest in amounts distributed by the partnership,
defined as a “Carried Interest.” The partnership
agreement executed later in the year, as would be
expected, provides excruciating detail concerning
computation of the Carried Interest.133 The residual
(final) tranche provides, as to allocation of available
amounts, twenty percent to the general partner and
eighty percent to the limited partners.134
In a 2007 communication, by which the employee
consented to the transfer of an interest, the employee also
referenced the equity interest. He wrote in pertinent part:
“I am complying with your request subject to a full and
fair resolution of the contractual arrangements between
us, specifically and including my carried interest of 5%,
which was established by contract in July of 1997.”135
There are, of course, a number of issues as to whether
this communication can adequately memorialize an
agreement. One party’s sending a communication does not
inherently give rise to the other’s assent. For our
purposes, the relevant part of the opinion is that it
expressly holds the language is not sufficiently definite to
be enforceable.
The appellate court’s discussion of the pertinent issue
of definiteness is, in whole: “Moreover, the terms of the
2007 letter are insufficiently definite, reflecting a mere
agreement to agree.”136
133
The partnership agreement expressly defined “Carried
Interest” as “the General Partner’s share of the Partnership’s profit
allocated pursuant to [specified sections of the partnership
agreement].” Affirmation of Paul Fattaruso in Support of Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment, exhibit 10, at I-4 (Amended and
Restated Limited Partnership Agreement of CVC/Opportunity Equity
Partners, L.P.), Dantas, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 133 (No. 650915/12),
NYSCEF Doc. No. 291.
134 Id. at 24–25, I-2.
135 Affirmation of Paul Fattaruso in Support of Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment, exhibit 21, n.p., Dantas, 2018 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 133 (No. 650915/12), NYSCEF Doc. No. 302.
136 Wilson v. Dantas, 103 N.Y.S.3d 381, 383 (App. Div. 2019),
appeal denied, 34 N.Y.3d 909 (N.Y. 2020).
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One might attempt to glean an understanding of the
analysis by referencing the trial court’s opinion. The trial
court’s opinion states in pertinent part, “the letter
otherwise does not specify how the term ‘Carried Interest
1 point ... 1 Point out of 20 Points (or 5%) of the General
Partner’s carried interest,’ was to be calculated, made or
paid.”137 A scattershot discussion of various principles of
contract law, including this reference to potential
indefiniteness, precedes a conclusion the dismissing the
contract claim.138
In sum, the appellate opinion indicates the terms set
forth in the above-quoted letter are not sufficiently
definite. This conclusion is dubious. It is not clear to this
author precisely what the letter means. It appears to
reference some investors whose investments may have
been separate and potentially outside the scope of those
interests as to which the employee was expected to have a
one-twentieth interest in the general partner’s twenty
percent carried interest.139 But insofar as any
compensation received by the general partner in respect
of those other investors’ interests was not adequately
proved, the solution is not to strike the plaintiff’s carried
interest in whole. Rather, a more suitable alternative
would be to strike the inadequately specified portion.140
(4) Specified Equity Percentage Where Structure to Be
Determined
McGowan v. Clarion Partners, LLC,141 involves a term
sheet for a new real estate investment management
Dantas, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 133 at *9.
Id. at *13–17.
139 There was evidently some dispute arising from the fact that
there were various ancillary types of investment vehicles that might
make investments to support part of the venture. And a disagreement
evidently involved the extent to which the employee’s alleged interest
included a part of the return funded by those ancillary investments.
Affirmation of Paul Fattaruso in Support of Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, exhibit 21, n.p., Dantas, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
133 (No. 650915/12), NYSCEF Doc. No. 302.
140 See supra notes 66–76 and accompanying text.
141 No. 650710/2015, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3558 (Sup. Ct. July 1,
2019), aff’d, 132 N.Y.S.3d 281 (App. Div. 2020), appeal denied, 37
N.Y.3d 903 (2021).
137
138
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business142 that the court on summary judgment143
determines is not sufficiently definite as to financial
arrangements to be enforceable.144 A management team
was to have an economic interest in the venture of thirty
percent, although the precise terms were not settled. In
particular, the term sheet stated, “The structure of this
economic interest is to be determined, and likely be
provided in the form of equity or income units and
performance units.”145 In addition to referencing other
considerations, the court expressly states that this
language makes the purported agreement insufficiently
definite.146
The opinion also denigrates the definiteness of other
aspects of the proposed equity interest using language
that elides what, to this author, seem significant
clarifications in the term sheet itself. The opinion,
referencing the term sheet, states, “It further indicates
that the management team would have vesting and
repurchase options but does not indicate what those
options are or how they work.”147 The opinion is here
referencing limits on the management team’s equity
interests. Omitted from the court’s summary is the term
sheet’s cabining of these limits being triggered by a
resignation “without good reason.” 148 So, although there
Id. at *1.
Id. at *26.
144 Id. at *18–19.
The opinion also grants summary judgement against a claim that
the term sheet gave rise to an enforceable agreement to negotiate
that was breached. Id. at *22, *24, *26.
145 Id. at *4.
146 Id. at *17 (“The Term Sheet clearly stated that the ‘structure of
this economic interest is to be determined, and likely to be provided in
the form of equity or income units and performance units’ (Term
Sheet at 1). The precise form of this economic interest is material and
would customarily be included in this type of transaction. Where an
agreement fails to indicate the nature of the equity consideration
given to one party, it fails for lack of definiteness.” (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted)).
147 Id. at *4.
148 Affirmation of Richard T. Maronney in Support of Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, exhibit 20, n.p., McGowan, 2019 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 3558 (No. 650710/2015) (“The management team equity
will have vesting and repurchase options by CPE[, the venture itself,]
142
143
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were vesting requirements and repurchase rights that
were not fully detailed, they would only be triggered by an
employee’s resignation without good reason.
The remedy sought on the claim alleging breach of
contract was money damages.149 Specific alleged amounts
that, if proved, could have been used to ascertain those
money damages included, inter alia, the lost value of the
interest, relocation (moving) costs and profit on
opportunities foregone.150
To this author, a promise of a thirty percent equity
interest is sufficiently definite for purposes of
ascertaining the amount of money damages, if the value
of the business enterprise itself can be proved with
sufficient definiteness. One might find support in a case
familiar to many U.S. lawyers from law school: Lefkowitz
v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc.151 In that case,
the court finds sufficiently definite to constitute an offer
an advertisement, at a price of $1, of “1 Black Lapin Stole
Beautiful, worth $139.50,”152 affirming a judgment of
$138.50. That disagreements can be expected as to the
amount of a minority discount and any impact of possible
limits on participation in decision-making seems
qualitatively similar to the types of uncertainties
generally inherent in proof of lost profits.
More concern arises for this author from condition as to
vesting limits and repurchase rights. The complaint
sought money damages for breach of contract, not specific
performance.153 The appellate court, which affirmed,
however, does not even reference vesting. And one
supposes that because the allegations included that the
defendant “refused to honor any of its contractual
obligations,”154 the vesting limits involve conditions that
on any vested equity should a management team member resign from
the firm without good reason.”).
149 Amended Complaint at 11, McGowan, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
3558 (No. 650710/2015).
150 Id. at 7–8, ¶¶ 38–40.
151 86 N.W.2d 689 (Minn. 1957).
152 Id. at 189, 192.
153 Amended Complaint, at 8 ¶ 41, 11, McGowan, 2019 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3558 (No. 650710/2015).
154 Id. ¶ 36.
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could be deemed satisfied by the defendant’s failure to
proceed.155
An alternative basis, referenced by both the trial court
and the intermediate appellate court, provides a stronger
footing. Immediately before the signatures, the document
states, “Agreed amongst the parties but subject to signed
documentations.”156 However, the significance of the case,
from the perspective of this article, is that courts indicate,
with varying levels of specificity, that the terms were
insufficiently definite to be enforceable in contract,
separate from consideration of this putative condition.
B. Confidentiality Provisions in Term Sheets, etc.
JTS Trading Ltd. v Trinity White City Ventures Ltd. 157
determines, on a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure
to state a claim,158 that a memorandum of understanding
concerning the formation of a real estate investment fund
is insufficiently definite to be enforceable.159 As is often
the case, this preliminary agreement includes some terms
that are too vague to be enforceable, as to the substance of
the proposed transaction. However, it also includes
promises such as agreements to maintain confidentiality
of information and a promise of exclusivity in discussions
for a specified time,160 which can be161 and in this case are
155 E.g. Doherty v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 99-9533, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14166, at *5 (2d Cir. June 15, 2000) (summarizing Haft
v. Dart Group Corp., 877 F. Supp. 896, 903 (D. Del. 1995), as follows:
“applying prevention doctrine when employer wrongfully dismissed
fixed-term contract employee without cause”).
156 McGowan, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3558, at *15.
157 No. 651936/2015, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1423 (Sup. Ct. Apr.
17, 2017).
158 Id. at *1.
159 Id. at *1–2, *10–11.
160 Affirmation of Tammy L. Roy in Support of Defendant UBS
Financial Services, Inc.’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings or, in the
Alternative, Dismiss the Complaint with Prejudice, exhibit 2, ¶¶ 14–
15, 17, JTS Trading, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1423 (No. 651936/2015),
NYSCEF Doc. No. 104 (including, inter alia, paragraphs titled,
“Confidentiality,” “Non Circumvention” and “Exclusivity”). The
memorandum states in part:
You appoint us as exclusive arranger of the Fund. You agree
not to appoint any other institution in connection with the
arranging of the Fund or capitalization of an Acquisition or to
award any institution any title, role, fees or other
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sufficiently definite to be enforceable. The claims
dismissed include an alleged breach arising from
discussions not permitted by the memorandum.162 So, the
treatment of the confidentiality provision is not dicta.
The court opines:
An agreement that leaves material terms to be
worked out in later negotiations and memorialized in
other agreements is merely an agreement to agree
rather than a contract.
Here, the specific
ample evidence that
bound contractually
relationship until
executed.163

language of the MOU provides
the parties did not intend to be
to each other in a partnership
more formal contracts were

It surely is better practice for an agreement of this
type, containing both precatory statements and provisions
intended to be binding, such as confidentiality and no-talk
agreements, to specify expressly which are binding and
which are not. But there is not a reason why the failure to
do so necessarily requires a court to conclude all parts of
the agreement are unenforceable.164 Of course, Joseph
Martin, Jr., Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher,165 would be
inconsistent with the view that the specification of a
promise to negotiate as to some terms, insufficiently

compensation, except as expressly provided for in the MOU,
without our prior written consent for a period of 120 calendar
days from the date all information requested in [sic] delivered
to [the plaintiff].
Id. ¶ 17.
161 E.g., Channel Home Centers, Div. of Grace Retail Corp. v.
Grossman, 795 F.2d 291, 293, 300 (3d Cir. 1986).
162 JTS Trading, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1423, at *9 (“engaging in
separate discussions with Sahara regarding financing for the Target
Properties”).
163 Id. at *9–10 (citations omitted).
164 See, e.g., NRE Cap. Partners, LLC v. Harker, No. 651792/2018,
2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 151 at *4, *10–11 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 2020)
(referencing a binding “break-up fee” in a letter of intent concerning a
loan where the lender was not obligated to extend credit). Whether
there is consideration is a separate matter that can arise in
connection with this type of arrangement.
165 417 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1981).
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definite to be enforceable, gives rise to the entire
arrangement being unenforceable.
C. Right of First Refusal
Doller v. Prescott166 also appears to involve an
excessively restrictive understanding of the definiteness
requirements. It appears an employee, named Doller, had
bargained for some equity interest. A review of the
memorandum of understanding indicates that, at the time
it was formed, it appeared there was some likelihood
shares in the employer owned by a co-owner and firm
president would become available following anticipated
resolution of pending litigation. The complaint recites, “it
was expected that the shares would soon become available
for Mr. Doller to purchase.”167 And the memorandum
references a right of first refusal being one mechanism by
which that interest might be conveyed. That
memorandum of understanding provided:
Doller shall be given a right of first refusal for
Equity. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
right of first refusal to acquire the Ryan Trust
Shares should they become available and/or equity
grants or an equity earn in. However, the precise
manner in which this Equity is offered shall be
determined subsequent to the End of Litigation or
circumstances deemed mutually sufficient by both
Prescott and Doller. It is understood, acknowledged
and agreed that the offer of Equity is a material
inducement
to
Doller
entering
into
this
Agreement.168
This provision is one of three provisions in a section
that begins, “The parties hereby understand and
acknowledge that while the Litigation remains pending
the transactions contemplated herein will be held in
abeyance. Upon the End of Litigation or circumstances
deemed mutually sufficient by both Prescott and Doller,
the parties will proceed diligently with a view toward the
91 N.Y.S.3d 533 (App. Div. 2018).
Verified Complaint at 5, ¶ 9, Doller v. Prescott, No. 906846-16,
2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2495 (Sup. Ct. June 26, 2017), aff’d, 91
N.Y.S.3d 533.
168 Id., exhibit B, at 3.
166
167
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following . . . .”169 The other provisions involve appointing
the employee to the company’s board and as president,
and increasing his salary by amending an existing
employment arrangement.170
The memorandum further indicates the employee
contemporaneously entered into a separate employment
agreement, specifying a title at that time as a Vice
President.171
The contract strikes this author as the product of
someone clearly conscious of the issue of severability,
intending to make the right of first refusal not something
that could be simply severed as fatally indefinite with no
compensation available even in restitution. These words
seem fully to communicate that failure to benefit from the
right of first refusal would “materially affect the object of
the contract, and thus . . . influence . . . [the other
contractual terms].”172
The opinion indicates the employee was fired two years
later, when he provided notice of a desire to exercise the
right of first refusal on the referenced shares, which the
defendant Prescott stated he would purchase for
himself.173
The appellate court affirms the lower court’s
determination that the agreement is unenforceable for
want of definiteness and as an agreement to agree.174 The
appellate court also dismisses a claim in restitution
(styled as “unjust enrichment”), concluding it was
“duplicative” of the claim on contract.175 In concluding the
contract was fatally indefinite, the appellate court
references
authority
founding
the
definiteness

Id. at 2.
Id.
171 Id. at 3.
172 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing
Minnesota’s standard for divisibility). The agreement does not have
an express severability provision.
173 Doller v. Prescott, 91 N.Y.S.3d 533, 536 (App. Div. 2018).
174 Id. at 537.
175 Id. at 538.
169
170
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requirement on assuring the parties have in fact
assented.176
The better way to conceptualize this arrangement, in
deciding whether it is sufficiently definite, is simply to
strike the reference to “or circumstances deemed mutually
sufficient by both [parties].” Consent of both parties is
required if the relevant time is to be something other
than—one supposes earlier than—the “End of Litigation”
(a term defined in the memorandum). That is, this
language simply makes explicit an inherent part of all
contracts—that the parties can thereafter collectively
agree to some other arrangement.
Referencing this alternative as a basis to make the
agreement unenforceable is inconsistent with the express
understanding that the provision is intended to be a
material inducement to the employee. And, in any case,
the alternative timing requires both parties consent. So,
relying on that provision in finding the agreement
indefinite has the perverse outcome of rendering
unenforceable an obligation because the obligation can be
changed but only with the obligor’s assent (as well as the
other party’s). And it is inconsistent with the notion of
cure by concession.177
We are then left with whether a right of first refusal is
unenforceable because it appertains to property that the
grantor of the right does not yet own but has some
likelihood of acquiring, based on ongoing litigation. In
substance, the memorandum of understanding provides
the employee with a right of first refusal on any
acquisition of the covered shares. But it also lays down a
potentially unenforceable marker: should the right on
those shares not be triggered, it is contemplated the
employee will have some other equity stake subject to
negotiation.
To say this right of first refusal is too indefinite for it to
be practicable for judicial enforcement is to say that
rights of first refusal are generally unenforceable, which
is not supportable, because the initially unspecified terms
176
177

Id. at 537.
See supra note 76.
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are supplied by subsequent events.178 The substantive
terms are whatever terms the writer of the right
bargains-for. Details such as the amount of time to
exercise the right, on notice that the right has been
triggered, are matters that parties may spend some time
bargaining about. But they are not qualitatively different
from terms that courts often supply where a contract does
not address the matter, such as the closing date for real
property.179 That term is not of such significance that one
can say failure to specify the detail is inherently
inconsistent with intending to assent.
And the uncertainty was moot in the case—the
litigation was triggered by the shares apparently
becoming available180 and the writer of the option
refusing, stating he intended to purchase the equity for
himself.181
That
is,
the
uncertain
alternative
arrangements for granting an equity interest became
moot by factual developments. Referencing indefiniteness
of a moot alternative as a basis to strike enforceability of
the other alternative is contrary to the principle that
subsequent events can clarify an agreement that is
problematically indefinite at initial formation.182
The court, in striking the reference equity interest, is
part of a peculiar mosaic. Some courts will strike
compensation not specified with adequate definiteness,
leaving the claimant with only the portion of the
compensation specified with adequate definiteness. And
such a court may also deny recovery in restitution183
(although others will not184).
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
E.g., N.E.D. Holding Co. v. McKinley, 157 N.E. 923, 924 (N.Y.
1927).
180 Verified Complaint, at 6, Doller, 2017 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2495
(No. 906846-16).
181 Doller, 91 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
182 See supra note 122 and accompanying text; see also supra note
69 and accompanying text (referencing “each party will be forced to
accept a reasonable determination of the unsettled point”).
183 See Foros Advisors LLC v. Digit. Globe, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 3d
354 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (discussed in pertinent part supra notes 92–101
and accompanying text).
184 See Brook v. Simon & Partners LLP, 783 F. App’x 13 (2d Cir.
2019) (discussed supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text).
178
179

41

In Doller, the rationale is couched in terms of assuring
the parties are not bound to arrangements as to which
they cannot reasonably be considered to have assented.185
Yet the opinion’s analysis instead operates to deprive an
employee of a bargained-for right, on which the employee
relied in connection with entering employment, merely
because either some details of the right of first refusal
were not specified or the employee at the time wanted to
preserve a negotiation stance in the counter-factual
circumstance in which the right would not have been
triggered.
The stream of authority, in this author’s view, simply
facilitates opportunism by employers. It facilitates a
process in which employers, and others seeking services,
secure services and underpay for them.
D. Thoughtful Avoidance of the Problem
Completeness commends reference to a very thoughtful
way in which one firm structured an arrangement
containing an agreement to agree so as to create
enforceable rights. A structured finance advisory firm
proposed a possible style of transaction, designed to take
aggressive advantage of an interpretation of tax law, to
financial institution. The thrust of the agreement
underlying the litigation was to limit the extent to which
the large financial institution could acquire information
about how to structure the transactions and thereafter do
transactions, cutting-out the advisory firm.
The agreement included an undertaking to negotiate a
“market based fee arrangement” upon entering into
transactions using the structure. Such an undertaking by
itself may have been insufficiently definite to be
enforceable on the substantive transaction terms. That
problem was mitigated by the financial institution further
agreeing not to participate in any covered transaction
unless it had entered into such a fee agreement.186

See supra note 176.
In particular, the agreement provided:
[Commerzbank] undertakes to enter into a written fee
agreement with SCS (“Fee Agreement”) prior to it effecting any
Transaction for itself or on behalf of an unrelated party. Such
185
186
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E. More Lenient Approaches
Contextualizing our preceding discussion requires
mention of other cases that are more willing to find
arrangements enforceable, in contexts where finding an
enforceable obligation seems subject to reasonable
disagreement.
One illustration, within the surveyed recent cases, 187 of
a court finding enforceable a contract that seems not is
Sustainable PTE Ltd. v Peak Venture Partners LLC.188
The opinion determines that a contractual undertaking to
provide “asset management services” is sufficiently
definite to be enforceable.189 As to a crucial element, the
opinion merely provides a conclusion the agreement
“identifies the services to be provided” without presenting
the relevant language.190 A review of the actual
agreement reveals the conclusion is unfounded. The
relevant provision involves one party’s being “appoint[ed]
. . . to provide the Asset Management Services,” with the
sole detail of scope of the asset management services set
forth in the following definition: “‘Asset Management
Services’ means the provision of asset management
services in relation to the Aman Hotels.”191
fee agreement will be negotiated in good faith and contain a
market based fee arrangement which will provide for fee(s) to
be paid to SCS by [Commerzbank] upon [Commerzbank]
entering into a Transaction. For the avoidance of doubt,
[Commerzbank] cannot use any Confidential Information or
proceed with, or participate in, a Transaction unless
[Commerzbank] has entered into a Fee Agreement with SCS....
Structured Cap. Sols., LLC v. Commerzbank AG, 177 F. Supp. 3d
816, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (alterations in original) (quoting the
agreement).
The agreement at issue in Doller v. Prescott, 91 N.Y.S.3d 533 (App.
Div. 2018), seems also to reflect a conscious endeavor to preserve a
recovery in restitution. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
187 Other recent authority of less note for our purposes includes
Suckling v Iu, 54 N.Y.S.3d 585, 586 (App. Div. 2017) (holding an
arbitration provision’s failure to specify the arbitration procedure
does not render it unenforceable).
188 56 N.Y.S.3d 44 (App. Div. 2017).
189 Id. at 46.
190 Id.
191 Affirmation of Robert Knuts in
Support of Plaintiffs’
Application for Entry of Default Judgment, exhibit 3, §§ 1, 3(a)
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This description of services seems wholly inadequate to
give rise to an obligation enforceable in contract. It does
not identify the types of assets to be managed (other than
they are related to the hotels) or whether all management
of the assets is to be done by the party (i.e., whether it is
to have full and exclusive responsibility for managing the
hotels), nor does it specify means that would allow one to
identify what activity would or would not be in breach.
(6) Conclusion
The collection of recent cases examined above reveals a
number of circumstances of potential in which
contemporary courts may find a material term specified
with insufficient definiteness of particular application to
investment vehicles in their formative stages. At that
time, the parties may not be able to detail fully the nature
of compensation to be based on profits. Yet agreements
reflecting incorporating type of information that one may
have available at the preliminary stages may be
considered insufficiently definite. Additionally, the
authority does not appear to pay careful attention to
expounding on and applying principles governing
divisibility or severability.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article selects from thoughts gleaned by reviewing
over eighty recent cases construing New York law on
definiteness requirements those most salient as to
formation of investment vehicles. This author’s general
sense is that courts frequently (but not always) required
more definiteness than he had expected (more
definiteness than seems suitable). Some of the salient
illustrations are summarized above. They seem likely to
frustrate the efforts of draftsmen who intend (or purport
to intend) to create binding obligations but whose efforts
are inhibited by the fact that contracting is sequenced,
with employees brought onboard before the venture’s
economics are finalized. The authority seems to reflect an

(emphasis removed), NYSCEF No. 167, Sustainable PTE Ltd. v. Peak
Venture Partners LLC, No. 650340 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. County N.Y. Dec.
10, 2015), modified, 56 N.Y.S.3d 44.
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unwarranted judicial impediment to forming contracts in
these contexts.
Additionally, the authority seems not to grapple
adequately with developing and applying principles of
divisibility and severability. Provisions designed to assure
at least recovery in restitution, reflecting what appears to
be a thoughtful approach to drafting, are present in some
of the cases—sometimes with success, sometimes not.
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